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Abstract 
This paper uses an unusual administrative dataset covering the universe of French hospitals to consider 
hospital employment: this is consistently higher in public hospitals than in Not-For-Profit (NFP) or 
private hospitals, even controlling for a number of measures of hospital output. NFP hospitals serve as 
a benchmark, being very similar to public hospitals, but without political influence on their hiring. 
Public-hospital employment is positively correlated with the local unemployment rate, whereas no such 
relationship is found in other hospitals. This is consistent with public hospitals providing employment 
in depressed areas. We appeal to the Political Science literature and calculate local political allegiance, 
using expert evaluations on various parties’ political positions and local election results. The 
relationship between public-hospital employment and local unemployment is stronger the more left-
wing the local municipality. This latter result holds especially when electoral races are tight, consistent 
with a concern for re-election. 
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Public Employment and Political Pressure: The Case of French Hospitals 
 
Andrew E. Clark and Carine Milcent 
 
1. Introduction 
The State is present in all market economies. This is particularly the case for public goods, of 
which two of the best-known are health and education. While the theoretical grounds for public-sector 
involvement, often expressed in terms of market failure, redistribution or economies of scale, are well-
known, empirical evidence on how outcomes are produced across the public and private sectors has 
arguably been slightly harder to come by.  
Our research focuses on health production, and specifically on employment levels in public and 
private hospitals. A substantial literature, both theoretical and empirical, has examined the impact of 
hospital ownership structures. Most empirical work here covers U.S. data (see Sloan et al., 2000, for a 
review): however, the structure of the U.S. healthcare market makes it is hard to disentangle the pure 
effect of hospital ownership from other institutional features such as the segmentation of insurance or 
payers and payment types (Lien et al., 2008). In a number of other countries, hospitals with a certain 
ownership type (often non-profit or public) dominate the market, precluding hospital performance 
comparisons across ownership types. The rich institutional structure of the French hospital sector 
allows us to revisit the question of whether State-owned firms employ “too many” workers. 
One advantage of looking at France in this context is that all of public, non-profit and for-profit 
hospitals enjoy significant market share. Another is that French National Health Insurance (the Sécurité 
Sociale) is a single-payer system: this eliminates any concerns about potential cost-shifting behaviour 
by providers, negotiation between providers and payers, or different reimbursement schemes for 
different payers. In addition, the National Health Insurance scheme sets its own fee schedule. For-profit 
hospitals, which are the only hospitals that can select their patients, are paid on a fee-for-service basis. 
This mitigates worries about patient selection in a prospective payment system, whereby hospitals may 
dump patients who are in worse health and are thus likely to cost more than the amount of the 
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reimbursement (Meltzer et al., 2002). Finally, French National Health Insurance reimburses almost all 
medical services in hospital, except the additional fixed fee per day for catering and accommodation 
claimed by for-profit hospitals. 
Reimbursement for public and non-profit hospitals was (at the time of our data) on the global 
budget basis. Neither of these two hospital types can select their patients, and as such any incentive not 
to treat patients should be the same for public and non-profit hospitals. Staff status is similar in private 
and NFP hospitals, where workers are salaried (or self-employed). On the contrary, employees are civil 
servants in public hospitals (which workers are very difficult to fire). Public-hospital employment is 
determined by the hospital's Board of Directors, which latter includes local government representatives, 
and in particular the Mayor; however, the Boards of Directors of private and NFP hospitals include 
neither local government representatives nor the Mayor. Overall then, non-profit hospitals are 
reimbursed in the same way as public hospitals, but with employment determined as in for-profit 
hospitals. This distinction will be crucial to us below. 
Some public hospitals provide preliminary basic health care. This is particularly true of local 
public hospitals, with relatively small numbers of beds. Other public hospitals provide more high-tech 
healthcare and a wider range of services in the context of a broader mission of care. This is the case of 
the research and teaching hospitals, which usually have more beds than other hospitals in the region. 
There is one such hospital in each of the French regions. Public hospitals that do not fall into these two 
categories are largely comparable to non-profit and for-profit hospitals, and provide the same types of 
healthcare. We here present results without distinguishing between public-hospital types, but do check 
that they are robust to dropping these research and teaching hospitals.  
The French system therefore allows for a relatively clean comparison of ownership types across 
hospitals which arguably provide similar healthcare services. Hospital types are not randomly-
distributed across the country, partly for historical reasons. Non-profit hospitals are particularly 
prevalent in the East of France. This reflects the 1901 Law on the separation of the church and the state, 
which obliged all French church hospitals to become State-owned public hospitals. However, in 1901 
 4 
the East of what is now France was not French (it was German).1 When the East became French again, 
the 1901 Law was not applied retrospectively and church hospitals there remained non-profit.  
We use administrative data covering all French hospitals in 1999, and show that employment in 
public-sector hospitals is greater than that in private-sector hospitals, for a given level of “health 
output” (as measured by the number and type of operations carried out, the care provided, and the bed 
capacity rate). Greater public-sector employment is more prevalent for Nurses and support staff; there 
is no significant difference public-private sector employment difference for Doctors. 
The regressions control for factors which might explain this employment difference, such as 
patient type and the health services produced. The greater employment in public-sector hospitals is 
more pronounced in regions with weaker labour markets (a higher local unemployment rate). One 
reading is then that public hospitals provide employment for those who might otherwise struggle in 
weaker labour markets. We will argue against an alternative reading that individuals in high-
unemployment regions have greater health needs (that are not picked up by our existing controls).  
The introduction of local politics allows us to separate these two readings. The “Keynesian” role of 
public hospitals2 (providing employment in weak labour markets) is only found in communities that 
voted left-wing. We then appeal to the tightness of the most recent local elections. This left-wing public 
hospital employment effect mostly occurs when electoral races are tight, consistent with public-sector 
employment reflecting not only health production, but also political prerogatives. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses employment in the public and private 
sectors. Section 3 describes the French healthcare sector and our hospital administrative data. Section 4 
then presents the regression results and underlines the role of the local labour market and political 
context in determining public-sector hospital employment. Last, Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                
1 This historical fact appears in the context of rules regarding the working week in Chemin and Wasmer (2009). 
2 In this paper, Keynesian will be used in the sense of providing employment in depressed labour markets. 
 5 
2. Public- and Private-Sector Employment 
The broad question of the public-sector labour market is dealt with in the excellent survey by 
Gregory and Borland (1999) in the Handbook of Labor Economics. In this section, we will restrict 
ourselves to one broad question: the level of public-sector, as compared to private-sector, employment. 
A number of papers have considered differences in the organisation of public- and private-sectors. 
Haskel and Sanchis (1995) suggest that the public sector might be inefficient in a production sense 
because firms there internalise the costs of workers’ effort: the public and private sectors therefore have 
different objective functions. Shleifer and Vishny (2002) provide a useful overview of various ways in 
which government intervention may be viewed. They distinguish between the “Helping Hand”, where 
government intervention serves to overcome market failure and raise social welfare, and the “Grabbing 
Hand”, where government agents act at least partly in their own self-interest.3 Boycko et al. (1996) 
consider efficiency and employment in the public and private sectors. As it is politically more difficult 
to propose subsidies to private-sector firms than to forego public-sector profits (which are more 
difficult to observe), privatisation will reduce political influence in production. Similarly, Keefer and 
Knack (2007) show that public investment across countries falls with the quality of governance, which 
they argue is consistent with some public investment consisting of rent-seeking. 
Direct tests of which sector is the most productive are difficult to carry out cleanly. The principal 
difficulty is measuring output, which is particularly tough in the areas where the public sector is 
prevalent, such as health and education. In addition, the comparison of outcomes across heterogeneous 
individuals may yield biased measures of value-added. In the context of health, private hospitals may 
cherry-pick patients who (unobservable to the econometrician) are in better initial health, or present a 
lower risk of complications. Health outcomes in private hospitals, be they mortality, morbidity or some 
other measure of health quality, will then reflect both hospital value-added and patient selection. 
Public-sector enterprises typically select less, by the very nature of their mission, rendering cross-sector 
                                                
3 Recalling the distinction between knights and knaves made by Le Grand (2007): “…knightly doctors, teachers or social 
workers would be ones who put the needs and wants of their patients, pupils or clients above their own; whereas knavish 
professionals are those who prioritize their own immediate interests above those of the people they were supposed to serve” 
(p.18). 
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efficiency comparisons particularly problematic. The particular structure of French healthcare is key 
here: we suggest below that the presence of non-profit hospitals helps to isolate selection. 
We consider the different economic and political influences on inputs, here employment, across 
sectors. The existing empirical evidence here is slight. Gentry and Penrod (2000) use American data to 
show that the number of staff per bed is higher in non-profit than for-profit hospitals (with median 
figures of 3.30 and 2.44 respectively); this difference continues to hold in a regression analysis which 
controls for various factors which might be thought to affect expected profit, including the local county 
population.  
The analysis we carry out here is related to that in Alesina et al. (2000), who argue that “public 
employment is used as a way of directing income toward disadvantaged groups” (p.219). In their 
model, some public employment is a disguised transfer that avoids opposition to direct transfers. They 
focus on income inequality and ethnic fragmentation, and consider the level of public employment in 
US cities (of over 25 000 inhabitants) in the early 1990s. The number of government employees per 
1000 of the total population or per 1000 of the working age population (18-64) is positively correlated 
with both inequality and ethnic fragmentation. They also find a positive correlation between 
government employment and local unemployment, although this is not robust to the inclusion of State 
dummies. Along similar lines, Alesina et al. (2001) argue that public-sector employment is excessive in 
the South of Italy, as compared to the North, so that public-service production in the South is less 
efficient than in the North. They conclude that half of the public wage bill in the South represents 
redistribution, either in the form of inefficient employment or excessive wages. 
 
3. French Hospital Employment Data  
French hospitals are of three broad types: public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit. We 
shall refer to these as public, NFP, and private, for simplicity.  
It is instructive to compare the systems of reimbursement and patient selection in France to those 
in the US. In the US, hospital reimbursement depends on the type of patient. All French patients are 
100% insured by the State, excluding selection by insurance type. Patients in French hospitals only 
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differ by their health problems; in the US they differ by both health problems and insurance. 
Reimbursement in France depends only on hospital type and the illnesses treated: public and NFP 
hospitals receive global budgets,4 whereas private hospitals are paid according to service. Public and 
NFP hospitals are non-profit: any profit in year t is rendered to the hospital regulator, and is subtracted 
from their budget in t+1. Public and NFP hospitals are legally forbidden to select patients, and the 
reimbursement system effectively gives them no incentive to do so. All else equal, patients generally 
prefer hospitals that are closer to their place of residence. As public and non-profits offer the same 
types of healthcare services and (as noted above), the distribution of non-profit hospitals is exogenous, 
the case-mix of patients (type or mix of patients treated by a hospital) is similar between these two 
hospital types. It should be underlined that we control for both illness severity and the cost weight in 
our regressions. Further, public and NFP hospitals treat a similar range of pathologies (DREES 
(Ministry of Health), 2008). As such, conditional on our other controls, these two hospital types should 
be similar in terms of reimbursement, selection and health-care services. This is not true for private-
sector hospitals, where patients can be selected in order to maximise profits. 
French private and non-profit hospitals are distinct in a variety of economic and legal ways (as in 
the United States) in addition to differences in their reimbursement schemes. Private hospitals are 
managed and controlled by Doctors who own the organisation and therefore its profit; by way of 
comparison, NFP hospitals do not have owners but rather self-perpetuating boards that have control 
rights. Moreover, NFP hospitals are entitled to receive charitable contributions. 
The three broad French hospital types do not only differ regarding reimbursement procedures and 
patient selection: there are also substantial differences in the status of their employees. Employees in 
NFP and private hospitals are private-sector workers, whereas those in public hospitals are civil 
servants (i.e. public-sector employees) who cannot be laid off for economic reasons.  
The pay of civil servants in public hospitals is not determined directly by performance, but rather  
by employee qualifications and job tenure. Staffing levels in public hospitals are decided by the Board 
of Directors, consisting of representatives of the medical staff, patients, and, crucially, the local 
                                                
4 A Payment-Per-Service system (widely known in the US as a Prospective Payment System - PPS) has been partially 
implemented in both NFP and public hospitals since 2004. One of the goals of this reform was to unify the reimbursement 
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government, including the Mayor. These latter do not appear in the Board of Directors of private and 
NFP hospitals. Local politics may well then influence employment in public hospitals in a way that it 
does not in NFP or private hospitals. As Mayors are democratically elected by the commune, they have 
an obvious interest in satisfying their electorate in order to conserve their position at the next election. 
In terms of our subject matter here, the Mayor may encourage hospital hiring to tackle local 
unemployment, even if the health-production case for such hirings is less clear. 
NFP hospitals thus occupy something of a hybrid position: regarding budget and patient selection 
they are like public hospitals, but for staffing they are analogous to private hospitals. This distinction 
will help us to interpret the regression results: NFP hospitals are subject to the same public-health 
requirements as public hospitals, but without any direct political influence on staffing. 
Our administrative data come from the 1999 SAE (Statistiques Annuelles des Etablissements) 
survey,5 which collected information on hospital staff and activities. We match in local-area 
information on the communal age distribution, unemployment, and nationality from the 1999 French 
Census. The data covers the universe of French hospitals, with 1788 establishments split up into 736 
public hospitals, 193 NFP hospitals, and 859 private hospitals.  
The SAE includes information on hospital size (the number of beds and the number of annual 
admissions), and the type of care that is provided to patients. It also provides information on the 
number of administrative staff, support staff, medical staff and Doctors. Support staff includes, for 
example, those working on buildings and grounds, or providing social assistance to patients. Medical 
staff consists of Nurses (including Specialised Nurses), paramedical staff (for example, physical 
therapists and dieticians) and nursing auxiliary staff. These four staffing groups differ notably by 
qualification level: support staff are the least-qualified, and Doctors the highest-qualified. Nursing and 
administrative staff include both qualified and unqualified workers. For example, some of the nursing 
auxiliaries do not have professional training (namely the ASH: “agent de service hospitalier”). 
The employment levels of administrative, support and medical staff (who are salaried) are 
calculated from readily-available information on hours worked to produce a full-time equivalents 
 
system and thereby to introduce a degree of competition between hospitals. 
5 As such, the data are previous to the budgetary reform acted for NFP and public hospitals mentioned above. 
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figure. This figure is comparable between the three hospital types. The situation is less clear for 
Doctors, who are civil servants in public hospitals but are private-sector salaried or self-employed 
(profession libérale) in both NFP and private hospitals. In the latter, many Doctors are self-employed 
and are associated with a patient rather than a specific number of hours in the hospital. Calculating full-
time equivalent figures is not straightforward: working hours are known for Doctors who have an 
employment contract, but we have to make some hypotheses about how much time the self-employed 
spend in the hospital. The analysis below assumes that self-employed Doctors work at their hospital 
50% of the time, and thus represent 50% of a full-time equivalent. While this is perhaps reasonable, we 
do check that all our results are robust to the more extreme assumptions of 0.1FTE and 0.9FTE. 
We focus here on hospital staffing: as shown in the raw data in Table 1, Public hospitals employ 
more staff than do NFP or private hospitals. This partly reflects hospital size, as some public-sector 
hospitals are much larger than those in other sectors. Measuring size by the yearly number of 
admissions, Table 2 shows average staffing levels by hospital type and number of admissions. The 
latter are split up into four categories (up to 5 000, 5 000-10 000, 10 000-16 000, over 16 000), which 
are the size cut-points used by the French Ministry of Health in their hospital comparisons. All public 
research and teaching hospitals have over 16 000 admissions. Unsurprisingly, total employment rises 
with the number of admissions. However, even within size-class, Public-sector hospitals employ more 
workers than do their non-public counterparts. Equally, employment grows with admissions for all 
hospital types, but grows the fastest for public hospitals.6 Similar results pertain with the number of 
beds as the measure of hospital size.7 
There are of course many reasons for employment to differ between hospitals, even conditional on 
hospital size. Obvious candidates here are the types of patients treated and health-care provided, 
perhaps resulting from patient selection by private hospitals. While this case-mix will affect 
employment in private hospitals compared to the others, it should not affect the comparison of NFP and 
public hospitals. We also formally control for hospital activity via the cost weight, from hospital 
                                                
6 This is most flagrant for the largest admissions category, but it also holds in the other size groups. 
7 Somewhat more recent 2004 hospital employment data also show exactly the same patterns. 
 10 
administrative records. Each hospital stay is associated with a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)8, and 
each DRG is allocated a ‘weight’ depending on the average cost of the inputs (e.g. nursing, diagnostic 
services, procedures) required to achieve the appropriate patient outcome. The hospital cost weight is 
the sum of all the DRGs of the stays in the hospital over the year. This index was first used in US; it is 
now also used in France where it is called the ISA (“indice synthétique d’activité”). One drawback of 
using hospital cost-weight data is that some observations are lost in the subsequent merge. We 
systematically check that our results are robust to the omission of the cost-weight variable. 
Cost-weight intuitively reflects differences in “what hospitals do” in terms of the types of 
treatment offered across hospital types. These treatment types can affect hospital employment 
(although some very costly procedures are not particularly labour-intensive). The analysis below will 
also control for illness severity (as measured by the Severity Gravity Index, SGI9), the bed occupancy 
rate (which will pick up any differences between patients in terms of recovery time after surgery etc.10) 
and a number of local population characteristics (at the municipality level).11  
 
4. Results 
4a. Hospital Employment: Labour-Market Tightness 
We regress log hospital employment on the log of hospital admissions, the log of the number of 
beds,12 mean ISA per stay (the cost weight), illness severity, and the bed-occupancy rate.13 At the 
                                                
8 The DRG divides hospital cases up into around 500 groups, which contain similar pathologies requiring similar levels of 
hospital resource use. 
9 We use Deyo’s adaptation of the Charlson co-morbidity index to measure the severity of co-morbidities (Deyo, 1992; 
Ghali et al., 1996). The Charlson index, which is expressed as a six-level variable, is constructed for each stay. This index is 
greater than 0 when a surgical procedure has been carried out on the patient. Validation exercises have shown that this index 
predicts mortality in longitudinal data (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997). 
10 It is always possible to think that there is some additional variable, uncorrelated with all of the above, that helps explain 
hospital staffing. However, it should be borne in mind that the main thrust of our paper is the different employment levels of 
public and NFP hospitals, neither of which can select patients. To this extent, any omitted variable would also need to be 
systematically different between these two hospital types. Our knowledge of the French hospital system suggests that this is 
not likely to be the case. 
11 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of all of the variables used in the analysis. 
12 Adding this variable actually produces no significant change in the other estimated coefficients. 
13 All of our key results continue to hold in regressions where employment, number of admissions and number of beds are 
entered in levels. 
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municipality level, we include the population percentage in the 60-74 and 75+ age groups, the local 
unemployment rate,14 and the percentage of the population who are foreign-born.  
In the first column of Table 4, we regress log hospital employment on the explanatory variables 
listed above. All of our regressions include heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and allow 
observations to be clustered by municipality. The cost-weight, illness severity and bed occupancy rates 
are divided by 100 here to produce coefficients that are easier to read. The key variables determining 
employment (apart from hospital type and the number of admissions) are the number of hospital beds, 
which adds additional information about hospital activity, and illness severity. Conditional on the other 
control variables, hospital cost weight is also significantly positively correlated with log employment, 
although only at the ten per cent level, and the bed occupancy rate is positive but insignificant. Last, as 
a whole the local unemployment rate adds nothing to our understanding of hospital employment.  
The estimated coefficients on hospital type conditional on all of our measures of hospital activity 
appear at the top of the table. These show that, ceteris paribus, public-sector hospitals employ more 
staff than do NFP or private hospitals. 
This first regression in Table 4 posited that local labour-market conditions have the same effect on 
employment across all hospital types. Column 2 of the same table relaxes this assumption and shows 
that it is indeed not a good one: the effect of local unemployment on hospital employment depends 
crucially on hospital type. We thus now interact local unemployment with hospital type: these three 
interaction variables replace the “local unemployment rate” variable in the first column.  
The estimated coefficients on public and NFP at the head of column 2 are very similar: when 
unemployment is low public and NFP hospitals are predicted to employ the same number of staff (at a 
given level of admissions, beds, hospital cost-weight and illness severity). The key coefficients in this 
column are the interactions. That between unemployment and the public hospital dummy is positive 
and significant at the 0.1 percent level. By way of contrast, that with NFP hospitals is negative and that 
                                                
14 An alternative to the local unemployment rate is a dummy variable for the municipality being in an area designated as a 
“Zone Urbaine Sensible” (ZUS). These latter are urban zones defined as priority targets of local politics, according to a 
certain number of indicators of local problems. The Law of November 14, 1996 defined a number of tax and social policies  
used to address these problems. All of our results with respect to unemployment can be reproduced using the ZUS dummy. 
As ZUS status changes less over time, it can be thought of as a more permanent indicator of local social malaise. 
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with private hospitals is insignificant.15 Higher local unemployment then goes hand-in-hand with 
higher employment levels in public-sector hospitals.16 The other explanatory variables in column 2 of 
Table 4 have much the same relationship with hospital employment as in column 1.  
Table 5 reproduces this analysis by staff type: administrative staff, support staff, medical staff and 
Doctors. In the first column of each panel, local unemployment has no significant effect on the 
employment of any personnel category: Table 4’s aggregate insignificant coefficient does not therefore 
hide any personnel-specific effect. Our main results continue to hold in three out of the four staff 
categories: public hospitals employ more staff than do other hospital types, and hospital employment is 
positively correlated with local unemployment only in the public sector. The exception is for Doctors, 
where, conditional on the other controls, there is no staffing difference by hospital type, and no 
relationship between Doctor numbers and local unemployment. While more deprived areas, here with 
higher unemployment, likely require more health care and thus more Doctors, the hospital activity 
variables seem to completely capture this health demand effect: dropping the number of admissions and 
the cost-weight from the bottom-right panel of Table 3, produces a positive and significant effect of 
local unemployment on Doctor employment for all three hospital types. 
Public hospitals then seem to react to local labour-market conditions in an entirely different way 
from non-public hospitals. The estimated coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with public 
hospitals playing a Keynesian role in providing employment in depressed areas (except for the group 
that arguably have the best employment prospects: Doctors). 
                                                
15 It may seem strange that higher unemployment is associated with lower staffing levels in NFP hospitals. However, we do 
control for the number of admissions in this regression (which very likely reflect the local demand for health services). If we 
drop admissions as a control variable, the interaction between unemployment and NFP in Table 2 becomes insignificant. 
16 That the public sector effectively provides partial insurance against unemployment is consistent with lower wages in the 
public sector (via a compensating differential) and with regional unemployment reducing the life satisfaction of private-
sector workers more than their public-sector counterparts (Luechinger et al., 2010). 
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Robustness 
It can be argued that the local unemployment coefficient in these tables is rather picking up local 
morbidity (and thus the demand for healthcare). We think that this is unlikely for three reasons. First, 
the regressions already control for health demand via admissions, illness severity and the hospital cost 
weight of the procedures used: together these should supply an accurate description of what hospitals 
do to their patients. As an additional test of the local demand for health, we added the municipal 
median income and death rate to the regressions: this did not change the results. 
Second, if unemployment does reflect morbidity, it only seems to do so in public hospitals. Private 
hospitals can cherry-pick their patients, and may thus be insulated from any general worsening of the 
client population’s health: this is consistent with public-hospital employment reacting to local 
deprivation while that in private hospitals does not. However, the estimated coefficients on NFP 
hospitals in Tables 4 and 5 go against the unemployment-morbidity explanation. NFP hospitals are 
very similar to public hospitals in that they do not select their patients and treat similar pathologies. 
Were local unemployment to reflect health demand, we would then expect it to have a similar impact 
on public and NFP hospitals: in fact it has no positive impact on employment in the latter. The cleavage 
in the effect of local unemployment is thus in terms of whether employment decisions are influenced 
by local politicians (as they are in public hospitals, but not NFP or private hospitals),17 rather than in 
terms of whether the hospitals can select their patients (private) or not (public and NFP).  
Last, as noted above, any generalised increase in health demand should be reflected across the 
employment spectrum. However, while local unemployment is associated with higher levels of staffing 
for most groups in public hospitals, this is not the case for Doctors.  
We have checked the influence of outliers by confirming that the results are robust to omitting the 
three very large central hospitals in our dataset: APHP (Assistance Public-Hôpitaux de Paris), APHM 
(Assistance Public-Hôpitaux de Marseille) and HCL (Hospices Civil de Lyon). More generally, they 
are robust to the omission of the research and teaching hospitals.  
                                                
17 As Boycko et al. (1996) note, “One key objective of politicians is employment”. 
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One last check that we carried out here relates to any difference in patient type, even conditional 
on illness severity, cost weight, and bed occupancy. The argument here is that public hospitals may 
treat individuals with less severe ailments but who require more staff care. As a test, we drop the first 
quartile of hospitals by average cost weight: this problem should be less prevalent in the remaining 
three quartiles. Our regression results do continue to apply when the first quartile is dropped. 
 
4b. Hospital Employment: Political Allegiance 
The numbers in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with employment in public hospitals reflecting both 
political and health priorities. To formalise the potential role of politics, we ask whether the effect of 
local unemployment is mediated by local politics. A growing literature has developed around the idea 
of political business cycles, with a smaller empirical counterpart that explicitly considers political 
influences on public employment. Coelho et al. (2006) identify pre-election employment effects in 
Portuguese municipalities, especially for the right. In the context of the current paper, they do not relate 
this employment effect to local unemployment. Lamo et al. (2007) appeal to country-level data in the 
Euro area and find some evidence of lagged pro-cyclicality of a number of measures of public-sector 
activity, although the evidence with respect to public employment seems less strong.  
We will here relate the size of the local unemployment effect to the political position of the local 
municipality. To do so, we appeal to the Political Science literature and use expert evaluations of 
various parties’ political positions to calculate a weighted political stance score. We will then show that 
the public hospital response to local unemployment is muted in more right-wing communes. 
Our expert evaluation scores come from Laver et al. (2006), who show not only the positions of 
French parties on the most salient policy dimensions, but also the relative importance that parties attach 
to each dimension (for more details, see the Appendix in Laver et al., 2006). This score takes values 
between 2.5 to 18.9, with higher scores referring to more right-wing parties. Our data refer to the 1995 
local elections. These might be thought to be distant in time from the observation of hospital 
employment in 1999: the results using the following 2001 local election outcomes are very similar. 
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We require data on the number of votes cast for each party in local elections. These data are 
unfortunately not available for communes with fewer than 10 000 inhabitants. For the sub-sample of 
larger communes we can thus match electoral outcomes directly to the hospital; for the smaller 
communes we will have to use the electoral results at a more aggregated level (known as the ZE, Zone 
d’Emploi, level). We expect this latter imputation to introduce measurement error. There are two sets of 
estimation results: one from direct matches over a smaller number of hospitals in larger communes, and 
the second from a larger sample where one key variable is less-accurately measured. We expect both 
the standard errors to be lower in the second case (due to the larger sample) and the estimated 
coefficients (via attenuation bias). This is in fact what we observe in the results.  
Our final political variable is called “Right”. As the different parties’ positions regarding “social 
policy” take values between 2.5 to 18.9, so does our political variable. It should be remembered that 
“Right” is a continuous variable, and not binary. 
Table 6 presents the results for the smaller sample matching hospitals to voting outcomes exactly. 
The top half of the table shows the estimated coefficients on interactions between local political 
position and hospital type in an employment regression. These show that more right-wing local areas 
have lower employment levels in public hospitals; there is no significant effect of local politics on 
employment in either NFP or private hospitals. The negative significant effect of “Right” on public 
hospital employment is found for total employment, Nurses and administrative staff. All of the 
regressions in Table 6 control for all of the other explanatory variables that appeared in Tables 4 and 5. 
The bottom half of Table 6 brings together the results from Table 5 (regarding local 
unemployment) and the top half of Table 4 (on local Politics). There are two sets of interactions here. 
The first (as in Table 5) interacts hospital type with local unemployment; the second then interacts this 
unemployment interaction with local Politics. The first set of interactions thus sets out how hospital 
employment moves with local unemployment, and the second tells us whether the size of the first 
interaction depends on the left/right position of the local municipality.  
The results first show that, as in Table 5, employment in public hospitals increases with local 
unemployment. However, the second set of interactions show that this “Keynesian” effect is diminished 
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as the local municipality moves to the right. Local labour-market conditions and local politics have 
barely any significant effects on employment in NFP or private hospitals. 
This same analysis on the larger sample of hospitals with political information matched at the ZE 
level produces results which are similar in terms of the signs of the interactions, but with much smaller 
estimated coefficients that render some of them insignificant. These results are available upon request. 
Table 7 illustrates the results from the bottom panel of Table 6 via a number of simulations of 
employment in public hospitals. The first line shows what we call a “Baseline” level of public-sector 
hospital employment: this is predicted from the employment regressions,18 with hospital type set equal 
to public and all other variables at their sample average. In other words, this is the predicted level of 
employment at a public-sector hospital in a municipality with exactly average characteristics 
We then effect two economic and political changes. We first change the local political tapestry by 
shifting 25 per cent of voters from the Parti Socialiste (left wing) to the RPR (now known as the UMP; 
right wing): this produces a shift in the “Right” variable of one standard deviation (of around 2.3 
points). The second change consists in reducing the local unemployment rate from the sample average 
of just under 16 per cent19 to just under 11 per cent (which again represents one standard deviation). 
Both changes are predicted to reduce public-hospital employment, for almost all types of staff. 
However, the effect of unemployment is particularly strong amongst support staff. This is the least-
educated group, and arguably that which is most at risk when the labour market sours.  
 
Interpretations 
We have suggested that public hospitals may provide employment in depressed areas, and 
especially in left-wing municipalities. We now consider some alternative explanations of this finding. 
 
1) Unemployment and Wages 
It is known that higher local unemployment reduces local wages (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994). Might greater hospital employment in deprived areas then reflect lower wages? There are three 
                                                
18 These means are from level employment regressions, as the log of the mean does not equal the mean of the log. 
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objections. First, if this were so, we would expect higher employment across all hospital types. Second, 
public-sector wages are largely fixed at the national level. Last, it is unclear why local politics in Table 
6 should mediate any wage response to unemployment.  
 
2) Unions 
Higher employment in public hospitals might reflect stronger public-sector unions, and unions may 
react to local unemployment. Two remarks seem salient here. First, while French union membership is 
very low, collective bargaining coverage is close to universal (OECD, 1997), so there is little coverage 
differential between the public and private sectors. Second, union membership is far more prevalent 
amongst Doctors than it is amongst Nurses and less-qualified workers, yet it is in this latter group that 
we find the greatest employment response to local unemployment. 
 
 
19 This is the average unemployment rate of the municipalities in which there is a hospital and is not weighted by 
municipality size. As such it is not representative of the unemployment rate in France. 
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3) Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? 
Local politicians may increase public-hospital employment as local unemployment rises for two 
reasons: to overcome market failure, or for their own interests. If politicians receive some rent from 
greater employment, then it is difficult to distinguish the grabbing from the helping hand. But if we 
consider that politicians’ self-interest partly reflects their desire to be re-elected, then a natural test 
presents itself. Levitt (1997) appealed to time differences in local elections to establish an exogenous 
effect of policing on crime. Here we consider a cross-section analogy: the closeness of the most recent 
election result. A “tight race” results if the difference between the votes cast for the winning party and 
the other parties was less than the median in the sample of municipalities in Table 6 above, and a not-
tight race otherwise. With the helping hand, parties with a large majority have greater latitude to push 
through policies: the political effect on employment will then be greater in not-tight races. However, 
under the grabbing hand parties may try to please voters more when there is a greater chance of being 
voted out next election: here we expect the political effect on employment to dominate in tight races. 
We thus re-estimated the bottom panel of Table 6 separately for tight and not-tight elections: the 
results appear in Table 8. The first line in each panel shows that public hospital employment rises with 
local unemployment in both tight and not-tight electoral races. The second line shows that local politics 
matter more significantly in tight electoral races. This is consistent with either left-wing municipalities 
increasing public-sector employment when unemployment is high (or right-wing municipalities 
reducing it in tighter labour markets). With larger political majorities, when the outcome of elections is 
more certain, these left-right differences broadly tend to disappear. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We here consider public employment and political pressure by looking at employment in three 
different types of French hospitals. Administrative data provide us with hospital-level information on 
the employment of four different kinds of workers, as well as hospital size, the kind of illnesses treated 
and so on. We first show that public hospitals employ more staff than do non-public hospitals, 
conditional on size and the illnesses treated.  
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Neither public nor NFP hospitals can cherry-pick their patients, and therefore deal with cases that 
are (unobservably in this dataset) more difficult to handle, and require more staff. Public and NFP 
hospitals may also provide different degrees of care than private hospitals. It is therefore difficult to 
judge any employment gap in terms of the efficiency of health-care production. 
We show that this employment gap depends on local economic and political conditions. By 
appealing to differences between hospital types, we suggest that hospital employment is affected by 
political influence. Between public hospitals (where employment is decided in part by local politicians, 
and which cannot select patients) and private hospitals (with no political influence, and which can 
select patients) there is a third category of NFP hospitals. Employment in NFP hospitals is also free of 
political influence, but patient selection is not possible. That public hospital employment is 
significantly higher than that in both private and NFP hospitals is consistent with the method of 
deciding employment rather than patient selection playing a key role. 
We provide support for this view by showing that the employment gap varies with two key local-
level variables: the unemployment rate and recent election results. Public hospital employment is 
positively correlated with local unemployment, whereas this is not true for other hospital types. The 
relationship between public-hospital employment and local unemployment is moderated by local 
politics: the more left-wing is the local commune, the stronger is the relationship. All the correlations 
we identify are more significant for lower-skilled workers. Overall, the results lead us to suspect that 
public hospitals play a dual role, partly being used as a policy instrument to provide local employment.  
There are a number of implications. A straightforward one is that employment in areas which have 
public-sector hospitals will move differently over the economic cycle to employment in areas with non-
public hospitals, or no hospitals at all.  
A second policy implication concerns the debate over the introduction of competition between 
hospitals. The employment externalities identified in our data call for caution in comparing hospital 
performance across types. If public hospitals provide employment to those who would otherwise 
struggle in a slack labour market (a “helping hand” activity20), they may well be penalised in 
                                                
20 This not only benefits those who obtain such jobs. Lower local unemployment may more broadly improve the quality of 
local life: see Öster and Agell (2007) for the relationship between unemployment and crime.  
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competitive health markets. However, a broader notion of public service may include not only good 
service to patients, but also local community needs in terms of employment. Any comparison of the 
public and private sectors purely in terms of the cost efficiency of the health service provided to 
patients will be inherently biased against the public sector, and may tell a misleading story with respect 
to social welfare. The question of whether this kind of job creation is a good way of using public 
money is crucial, but not one that we can answer with our current data.  
Shleifer and Vishny (2002) distinguished between government actions that served to increase 
social welfare and those designed for politicians’ self-interest: the helping and grabbing hands. Finding 
greater public-sector employment in high unemployment areas is arguably consistent with both 
readings. Greater employment may raise social welfare, or increase the resources that politicians 
control and their re-election chances. In this optic, it is of interest to ask why the employment response 
should be greater for left-wing rather than right-wing administrations. The helping hand reading is that 
left-wing councils believe that the externalities from unemployment are higher; the grabbing hand 
reading is that local politicians follow their electorates’ preferences in this matter in order to preserve 
their own position. The finding that local politics only matters when the previous election was 
relatively tight is consistent with the latter reading.  
Last, and perhaps most generally, we might wonder to what extent French hospitals are a special 
case. It would be of great interest to see whether the same employment effects exist in other areas of 
public-sector activity, such as the railways, education and local administrations, and indeed whether we 
have uncovered an “exception française”, or whether the employment-unemployment-politics nexus is 
a general characteristic of the public sector in other countries. 
Table 1. Employment by Hospital Type 
      
Hospital Type No. of Hospitals No. of Employees Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Public 736 825.7 3143.0 17.4 77253.6 
NFP 193 282.8 287.2 10.8 1906.0 
Private 859 139.3 104.9 4.0 935.3 
Note: Number of employees measured in FTEs.   
 
 
Table 2: Number of Admissions by Hospital Type 
      
 
Public NFP Private 
< 5000 Admissions 168.5 N=415 
148.9 
N=122 
89.5 
N=590 
5000-10 000 Admissions 489.2 N=110 
394.3 
N=54 
211.8 
N=218 
10 000-16 000 Admissions 802.4 N=76 
644.4 
N=11 
377.4 
N=44 
> 16 000 Admissions 3133.6 N=135 
1339.8 
N=6 
578.6 
N=7 
 
Table 3. Hospital Employment Levels and Variable Means 
      
Variable No. of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
No. Employees 1788 437.35 2045.60 4 77253.6
No. Nurses 1788 274.33 1278.61 0.8 48786.26
No. Support Staff 1788 71.76 327.04 0 11196.06
No. Administrative Staff 1788 48.50 239.44 0 9193.58
No. Doctors 1788 42.76 208.04 0 8077.7
No. of Beds 1713 66.80 247.14 1 9216
No. of Admissions 1744 6802.42 18409.93 2 606298
Illness Severity 1788 5.09 25.23 0 768.92
Cost Weight (ISA) 1361 918.49 304.48 71.16 2848.27
Bed Occupancy Rate 1718 73.81 18.36 0.18 179.71
Local Unemployment Rate (/100) 1788 0.148 0.048 0 0.356
Median Municipality Income 1784 13900.24 2960.20 7733.89 33764.87
Municipality Death Rate (/100) 1788 0.011 0.004 0 0.043
Local % Foreign-Born (/100) 1788 0.062 0.046 0 0.297
Local % Aged 60-74 (/100) 1788 0.140 0.031 0.029 0.251
Local % Aged 75+ (/100) 1788 0.093 0.034 0 0.313  
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   Table 4. Hospital Employment and Labour-Market Tightness 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Public 0.745*** (0.274) 0.586** (0.276)
NFP 0.207 (0.269) 0.587** (0.297)
Private -0.371 (0.258) -0.285 (0.264)
Public*Local Unemployment 1.298*** (0.466)
NFP*Local Unemployment -2.274*** (0.674)
Private*Local Unemployment -0.336 (0.436)
Log Admissions 0.604*** (0.026) 0.602*** (0.026)
Log Number of Beds 0.060*** (0.015) 0.059*** (0.015)
Illness Severity (/100) 0.298*** (0.114) 0.294** (0.120)
Cost Weight (/100) 0.012* (0.006) 0.011* (0.006)
Bed Occupancy Rate (/100) 0.053 (0.070) 0.050 (0.070)
Local Unemployment Rate (/100) 0.017 (0.311)
Local % Foreign-Born (/100) 0.555* (0.284) 0.520* (0.292)
Local % Aged 60-74 (/100) -1.279* (0.760) -1.316* (0.769)
Local % Aged 75+ (/100) -0.128 (0.794) -0.092 (0.801)
Number of observations 1327 1327  
 
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; and * = significant at the 10% 
level.    
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Table 5. Hospital Employment and Local Deprivation: By Staff Type 
 
  
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Public 0.069 (0.293) -0.062 (0.295) -0.944** (0.458) -1.227*** (0.435)
NFP -0.584** (0.289) -0.162 (0.310) -1.670*** (0.447) -1.096** (0.484)
Private -1.125*** (0.275) -1.062*** (0.281) -2.983*** (0.444) -2.818*** (0.484)
Public*Local Unemployment 1.248*** (0.463) 2.326*** (0.594)
NFP*Local Unemployment -2.405*** (0.680) -3.347*** (1.286)
Private*Local Unemployment -0.054 (0.435) -0.657 (1.325)
Log Admissions 0.618*** (0.027) 0.616*** (0.027) 0.542*** (0.037) 0.539*** (0.037)
Log Number of Beds 0.045*** (0.015) 0.044*** (0.015) 0.112*** (0.033) 0.110*** (0.033)
Illness Severity (/100) 0.278** (0.111) 0.276** (0.116) 0.364*** (0.130) 0.359** (0.139)
Cost Weight (/100) 0.025*** (0.007) 0.025*** (0.007) 0.026** (0.013) 0.026** (0.012)
Bed Occupancy Rate (/100) 0.129* (0.078) 0.126 (0.077) 0.248 (0.216) 0.244 (0.216)
Local Unemployment Rate (/100) 0.158 (0.296) 0.067 (0.806)
Local % Foreign-Born (/100) 0.102 (0.327) 0.061 (0.343) 0.140 (0.679) 0.088 (0.672)
Local % Aged 60-74 (/100) -1.254 (0.829) -1.277 (0.840) -0.690 (1.363) -0.774 (1.365)
Local % Aged 75+ (/100) -0.097 (0.852) -0.084 (0.864) -1.791 (1.451) -1.706 (1.439)
Number of observations 1327 1327 1313 1313
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Public -1.573*** (0.292) -1.764*** (0.295) -3.387*** (0.342) -3.423*** (0.352)
NFP -1.781*** (0.286) -1.585*** (0.323) -3.386*** (0.326) -3.240*** (0.394)
Private -2.575*** (0.275) -2.456*** (0.281) -3.359*** (0.314) -3.345*** (0.314)
Public*Local Unemployment 1.368*** (0.476) -0.236 (0.668)
NFP*Local Unemployment -1.191 (0.735) -1.437 (1.389)
Private*Local Unemployment -0.680 (0.530) -0.572 (0.565)
Log Admissions 0.598*** (0.028) 0.596*** (0.028) 0.860*** (0.034) 0.860*** (0.034)
Log Number of Beds 0.076*** (0.017) 0.074*** (0.018) 0.033 (0.023) 0.033 (0.023)
Illness Severity (/100) 0.313*** (0.116) 0.309** (0.122) 0.203*** (0.079) 0.203** (0.080)
Cost Weight (/100) 0.002 (0.007) 0.002 (0.007) -0.032*** (0.009) -0.033*** (0.009)
Bed Occupancy Rate (/100) 0.107 (0.076) 0.105 (0.076) -0.369*** (0.130) -0.370*** (0.130)
Local Unemployment Rate (/100) -0.072 (0.380) -0.540 (0.480)
Local % Foreign-Born (/100) 1.573*** (0.337) 1.559*** (0.331) 1.138*** (0.364) 1.124*** (0.365)
Local % Aged 60-74 (/100) -0.051 (0.789) -0.112 (0.793) -1.678 (1.025) -1.683 (1.024)
Local % Aged 75+ (/100) -1.608* (0.820) -1.526* (0.824) 0.603 (1.146) 0.603 (1.151)
Number of observations 1326 1326 1317 1317
Nurses Support Staff
DoctorsAdministrative Staff
 
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; and * = significant at the 10% level.  
Table 6. Politics, Unemployment and Hospital Staffing: Reduced Sample 
 
Public 0.151 (0.306) -0.744** (0.318) -1.504** (0.582) -1.942*** (0.324) -3.137*** (0.287)
NFP -0.710* (0.368) -1.658*** (0.389) -2.694*** (0.723) -2.369*** (0.387) -3.317*** (0.362)
Private -1.190*** (0.258) -2.108*** (0.267) -3.963*** (0.590) -3.186*** (0.279) -3.324*** (0.264)
Public*Right -0.019** (0.009) -0.023*** (0.009) -0.012 (0.011) -0.015* (0.009) -0.001 (0.008)
NFP*Right 0.013 (0.023) 0.006 (0.025) 0.030 (0.041) 0.007 (0.023) 0.004 (0.025)
Private*Right 0.007 (0.008) 0.001 (0.009) 0.026 (0.025) 0.008 (0.009) 0.009 (0.010)
Local Unemployment Rate (/100) 0.009 (0.359) 0.164 (0.321) 0.354 (0.988) -0.197 (0.441) -0.684 (0.512)
Number of observations
Public -0.217 (0.295) -1.118*** (0.300) -1.892*** (0.568) -2.276*** (0.327) -3.177*** (0.300)
NFP -0.230 (0.278) -1.175*** (0.279) -1.913*** (0.579) -2.099*** (0.329) -3.257*** (0.343)
Private -1.074*** (0.259) -2.066*** (0.264) -3.598*** (0.603) -3.038*** (0.285) -3.221*** (0.239)
Public*Local Unemployment 2.530*** (0.855) 2.732*** (0.860) 3.126*** (1.082) 2.120** (0.850) -0.417 (0.819)
NFP*Local Unemployment -2.001 (1.608) -1.345 (1.685) -3.921* (2.374) -1.560 (1.621) -1.775 (1.391)
Private*Local Unemployment -0.580 (0.771) -0.032 (0.834) -1.794 (2.514) -1.164 (0.817) -1.164 (0.987)
Public*Local Unemployment*Right -0.134** (0.054) -0.155*** (0.055) -0.095 (0.072) -0.110* (0.057) -0.012 (0.046)
NFP*Local Unemployment*Right -0.009 (0.132) -0.099 (0.140) 0.142 (0.190) 0.018 (0.129) 0.089 (0.175)
Private*Local Unemployment*Right 0.033 (0.056) 0.009 (0.060) 0.157 (0.165) 0.055 (0.059) 0.041 (0.064)
Number of observations
Administrative Staff
DoctorsAll Nurses Support Staff Administrative Staff
DoctorsAll Nurses Support Staff
1072 1072 1072 1072 1072
1072 1072 10691061 1072  
Note: All regressions also control for Number of Beds, Illness Severity, Cost Weight, Bed Occupancy Rate, the local % Foreign-Born, the local % Aged 60-74, and the local 
% Aged 75+. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; and * = significant at the 10% level. 
Table 7. Estimated Public-Hospital Employment Effects of Politics and Economics 
     
      
All Nurses Support Staff
Administrative 
Staff Doctors
Table 6 - bottom
Baseline 904.1 568.1 179.0 91.6 65.4
25% vote switch Left to Right -4.9% -5.6% -3.5% -4.0% -0.4%
Unemployment rate drops from 16% to 11% -5.4% -5.3% -10.0% -4.6% 2.8%    
      
 
 
 
Table 8. Politics, Unemployment and Hospital Staffing: The Role of Tight Electoral Races 
      
 
All Nurses Support Staff Administrative 
Staff
Doctors
Tight Electoral Races
Public*Local Unemployment 3.012** 3.281*** 3.641** 2.330* -0.275
(1.213) (1.186) (1.703) (1.252) (1.002)
Public*Local Unemployment*Right -0.175** -0.203*** -0.143 -0.138* -0.029
(0.073) (0.072) (0.106) (0.081) (0.058)
Not-Tight Electoral Races
Public*Local Unemployment 2.115* 2.223* 2.606* 2.103* -0.468
(1.269) (1.313) (1.440) (1.187) (1.309)
Public*Local Unemployment*Right -0.123 -0.141* -0.078 -0.103 -0.023
(0.082) (0.084) (0.106) (0.081) (0.071)  
 
     
Note: All regressions also control for the other variables indicated in Table 6. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = 
significant at the 5% level; and * = significant at the 10% level. 
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